Commentary for Kiddushin 82:8
לא נכתוב רחמנא בקדשים ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן ישנן חול אצל קדשים לא נכתוב רחמנא בגירושין ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן ישנן במחשבה
Should the Divine Law not state it of sacrifices, that it may be derived from these others? As for these, [it might be argued] that [sc. agency] is because they rank as secular in comparison with sacrifices. Should the Divine Law omit it in the case of divorce, that it may be derived from the others: as for these, that is because intention has force in their case.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Terumah, v. p. 206, n. 5; sacrifices: If one resolves to declare an animal a sacrifice, it is so, even without an explicit declaration. - Shebu. 26b.');"><sup>17</sup></span>
Daf Shevui to Kiddushin
We have discussed four issues—marriage, divorce, terumah and sacrifices, and stated that the right to appoint an agent cannot be derived from one of them and therefore the Torah had to teach agency in all of them. But maybe we can derive from two of them that agency works in the others? If so, why would the Torah have to teach the efficacy of agency in the others? The Talmud will now test this out.
We could not derive agency in sacrifices from the other cases, because sacrifices are holy whereas the other matters are either not holy at all, or less so. Therefore, the Torah had to teach the efficacy of agency with regard to sacrifices.
We could not derive agency in sacrifices from the other cases, because sacrifices are holy whereas the other matters are either not holy at all, or less so. Therefore, the Torah had to teach the efficacy of agency with regard to sacrifices.
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Daf Shevui to Kiddushin
We could not derive agency in divorce from agency sacrifices and terumah because sacrifices and terumah can be designated by thought only. This is not true of divorce—the man must give the woman a get. It is not sufficient for him to merely think that he wishes to divorce her.
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