Commentary for Sanhedrin 124:10

עד כאן לא בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה אלא אי לחיובי חדא אי לחיובי תרתי פטור לגמרי ליכא למאן דאמר

But R. Johanan [who said, 'Go, teach it outside'.] was consistent with his attitude [elsewhere], that two clauses of a Mishnah must not be interpreted as referring each to different circumstances — for R. Johanan said: He who will explain to me the Mishnah of 'a barrel' to agree with one Tanna entirely, I shall carry his clothes for him to the baths.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., I would be his servant. The reference is to a Mishnah on B.M. 40b: If a barrel was entrusted to a man's keeping, a particular place being assigned to it, and this man moved it from the place where it was first set down, and it was broken. — Now, where it was broken whilst he was handling it, then if he was moving it for his own purposes (e.g., to stand on it), he must pay for it; if for its sake (e.g., if it was exposed to harm in the first place), he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had set it down, then in both cases he is not liable. If the owner, however, had assigned a place to it, and this man moved it, and it was broken, whether whilst in his hand or after he had set it down: if he moved it for his sake, he is liable; if for its own, he is not. The Talmud then proceeds to explain that the first clause is in accordance with R. Ishmael, who maintained that if one stole an article and returned it without informing its owner, he is free from all further liability in respect of it. Consequently, if he moved the barrel for his own purpose (which is like stealing), and set it down elsewhere, no particular place being assigned to it, his liabilities have ceased. But the second clause agrees with R. Akiba's ruling that if an article is stolen and returned, the liability remains until the owner is informed of its return. Consequently, if he moved it for his own purpose, he remains liable even after it is set down. But R. Johanan was dissatisfied with this explanation, holding that both clauses should agree with one Tanna. Now, the Talmud does actually explain that it can agree with one Tanna, viz., by assuming that in the first clause the barrel was subsequently returned to its original place, but that in the second clause it was not. Consequently, it concurs entirely with R. Ishmael, but his liability continues in the second instance because he did not return it to its first place. But R. Johanan rejects this explanation, not deeming it plausible to conceive of such different circumstances in the two clauses of the Mishnah. For the same reason, when R. Zakkai taught that sometimes the Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts, and sometimes it is the reverse, R. Johanan would not accept an interpretation whereby 'other precepts' in the first clause means idolatry, whilst in the second it referred to forbidden fat. ');">⁹</span>

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