Sanhedrin 124
הכי תנא קמיה חומר בשבת משאר מצות חומר בשאר מצות מבשבת חומר בשבת שהשבת עשה שתים בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת מה שאין כן בשאר מצות חומר בשאר מצות שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב מה שאין כן בשבת
This is the teaching which he [R. Zakkai] recited to him [R. Johanan]: [In one respect] the Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts; [in another,] it is the reverse. Now the Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts — in that if one did two acts of work in one state of unawareness, he must make atonement for each separately; this is not so in the case of other precepts. Other precepts are more stringent than the Sabbath, for in their case, if an injunction was unwittingly and unintentionally violated, atonement must be made: this is not so with respect to the Sabbath.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The Talmud discusses further on what is meant by unwittingly and unintentionally. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
אמר מר חומר בשבת שהשבת עשה שתים כו היכי דמי אילימא דעבד קצירה וטחינה דכוותה גבי שאר מצות דאכל חלב ודם הכא תרתי מיחייב והכא תרתי מיחייב
The Master said: 'The Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts, in that if one did two acts of work etc.' How so? Shall we say that he reaped and ground [corn]? Then an analagous violation of other precepts would be the partaking of forbidden fat and blood — but in both cases, two penalties are incurred! But how is it possible in the case of other precepts that only one liability is incurred? E.g., if one ate forbidden fat twice;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In one state of unawareness, not being reminded in between that this fat is forbidden, ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
אלא גבי שאר מצות דאינו חייב אלא אחת היכי דמי דאכל חלב וחלב דכוותה גבי שבת דעבד קצירה וקצירה הכא חדא מיחייב והכא חדא מיחייב
then by analogy, the Sabbath was desecrated by reaping twice — but in each case, only one liability is incurred! Therefore R. Johanan said to him? 'Go, teach it outside!'
והיינו דאמר ליה פוק תני לברא
But what is the difficulty? Perhaps it can be explained after all as referring to reaping and grinding. whilst 'this is not so in the case of other precepts' refers to idolatry, and in accordance with the dictum of R. Ammi, who said: If one sacrificed, burnt incense, and made libations [to an idol] in one state of unawareness, only one penalty is incurred [though a number of services were performed]! — This cannot be explained as referring to idolatry, because the second clause states: 'Other precepts are more stringent than the Sabbath, for in their case, if an injunction was unwittingly and unintentionally violated, atonement must be made.' Now, how is an unwitting and unintentional transgression of idolatry possible? If one thought it [sc. an idolatrous shrine] to be a synagogue, and bowed down to it — but his heart was to heaven! But it must mean that he saw a royal statue, and bowed down to it; now, if he accepted it as a god, he is a deliberate sinner; whilst if he did not accept it as a god, he has not committed idolatry at all. Hence it must mean that he worshipped it idolatrously through love or fear. Now this agrees with Abaye's view that a penalty is incurred; but on Raba's view that there is no liability, what can you say? You will therefore explain that his inadvertency arose through his declaring that idolatry is permissible.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And since he has never known of any prohibition, it is not only regarded as unwitting, but as unintentional too. Cf. 62a top. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
מאי קושיא דילמא לעולם אימא לך דעבד קצירה וטחינה מה שאין כן בשאר מצות אתאן לעבודת כוכבים כדרבי אמי דאמר ר' אמי זיבח וקיטר וניסך בהעלם אחד אינו חייב אלא אחת
Then 'this is not so in the case of the Sabbath' will mean that there is no liability at all.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If one worked on the Sabbath, not knowing that there is any prohibition against it. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
לא מיתוקמא ליה בעבודת כוכבים דקתני סיפא חומר בשאר מצות שבשאר מצות שגג בלא מתכוין חייב
But this cannot be so, for when Raba propounded to R. Nahman, 'What if one is unaware of both [i.e. that it is the Sabbath, and that labour on the Sabbath is forbidden],' his problem was whether one sacrifice is incurred or two [one for each act of work]; but none maintain that he is entirely exempt? What difficulty is this! Perhaps after all, it ought be said, the first clause [dealing with the greater severity of the Sabbath] refers to idolatry, whilst the second treats of other precepts; the unwitting and unintentional transgression of which consisted of thinking that [melted forbidden fat] was spittle, which he swallowed. [For this, liability is incurred,] which is not so with regard to the Sabbath, there being no liability [in an analogous case, e.g.,] if one intended lifting something detached from the soil, but accidently tore out a plant from the earth, he is exempt from a penalty.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cutting or tearing out anything growing in the earth is a forbidden labour on the Sabbath. His offence was both unwitting and unintentional for (i) he had no intention of tearing out anything and (ii) he did not know that this was growing in the soil, Now, had he known that it was growing in the soil and deliberately uprooted it in ignorance of the forbidden nature of that action, his offence would have been unwitting but intentional. By analogy, had be intended to eat the melted fat, thinking that it was permitted, his offence would be regarded as unwitting but intentional. Since, however, he did not intend eating it at all, but accidentally swallowed it, thinking at the same time that it was spittle, his offence was both unwitting and unintentional. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
שוגג בלא מתכוין בעבודת כוכבים היכי דמי אי דקסבר בית הכנסת הוא והשתחוה לו הרי לבו לשמים אלא דחזא אנדרטא וסגיד ליה אי קבליה עליה באלוה מזיד הוא ואי לא קבליה עליה לא כלום היא
Now, this is in accordance with R. Nahman's dictum in Samuel's name, viz., He who violates the injunction of forbidden fat or consanguineous relationship whilst intending to do something else<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' E.g., if he reached out for a permitted piece, and accidentally took the forbidden fat, or mistook his sister for his wife. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
אלא מאהבה ומיראה הניחא לאביי דאמר חייב אלא לרבא דאמר פטור מאי איכא למימר
is liable to a penalty, since he derived pleasure thereby. But he who mistakenly did a forbidden act on the Sabbath whilst intending to do another<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Whether the other itself was forbidden or permitted. So Tosaf. Rashi, however, in Shebu. 19a explains it that he intended doing a permitted act, but mistakenly did a forbidden one, in accordance with the example given here. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
אלא באומר מותר מה שאין כן בשבת דפטור לגמרי
is free from penalty — because the Torah prohibited only a calculated action.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Hence the distinction drawn in the second clause between the Sabbath and other precepts is quite feasible. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
עד כאן לא בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן העלם זה וזה אלא אי לחיובי חדא אי לחיובי תרתי פטור לגמרי ליכא למאן דאמר
But R. Johanan [who said, 'Go, teach it outside'.] was consistent with his attitude [elsewhere], that two clauses of a Mishnah must not be interpreted as referring each to different circumstances — for R. Johanan said: He who will explain to me the Mishnah of 'a barrel' to agree with one Tanna entirely, I shall carry his clothes for him to the baths.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., I would be his servant. The reference is to a Mishnah on B.M. 40b: If a barrel was entrusted to a man's keeping, a particular place being assigned to it, and this man moved it from the place where it was first set down, and it was broken. — Now, where it was broken whilst he was handling it, then if he was moving it for his own purposes (e.g., to stand on it), he must pay for it; if for its sake (e.g., if it was exposed to harm in the first place), he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had set it down, then in both cases he is not liable. If the owner, however, had assigned a place to it, and this man moved it, and it was broken, whether whilst in his hand or after he had set it down: if he moved it for his sake, he is liable; if for its own, he is not. The Talmud then proceeds to explain that the first clause is in accordance with R. Ishmael, who maintained that if one stole an article and returned it without informing its owner, he is free from all further liability in respect of it. Consequently, if he moved the barrel for his own purpose (which is like stealing), and set it down elsewhere, no particular place being assigned to it, his liabilities have ceased. But the second clause agrees with R. Akiba's ruling that if an article is stolen and returned, the liability remains until the owner is informed of its return. Consequently, if he moved it for his own purpose, he remains liable even after it is set down. But R. Johanan was dissatisfied with this explanation, holding that both clauses should agree with one Tanna. Now, the Talmud does actually explain that it can agree with one Tanna, viz., by assuming that in the first clause the barrel was subsequently returned to its original place, but that in the second clause it was not. Consequently, it concurs entirely with R. Ishmael, but his liability continues in the second instance because he did not return it to its first place. But R. Johanan rejects this explanation, not deeming it plausible to conceive of such different circumstances in the two clauses of the Mishnah. For the same reason, when R. Zakkai taught that sometimes the Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts, and sometimes it is the reverse, R. Johanan would not accept an interpretation whereby 'other precepts' in the first clause means idolatry, whilst in the second it referred to forbidden fat. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>