Responsa for Ketubot 167:5

Q. May one heir sue his father's debtors independently of the other heirs?
A. Each heir may sue and collect his share of the inheritance.
SOURCES: Cr. 85; Pr. 212; Tesh. Maim. to Kinyan, 13; Am II, 8.

Q. Does a woman collect her ketubah from a loan that has been secured by a pledge at the time the loan was contracted? Does a first-born son receive a double share from such a loan?
A. A woman may collect her ketubah from all loans, even from loans that are not secured by pledges. Nowadays especially, since a woman may collect her ketubah from movables — and even after the loan is repaid to the orphans she may demand the money thus repaid in payment of her ketubah — she is entitled to collect directly from the debtor. Moreover, the custom of collecting the ketubah from movables and from loans, is well established in our time. Such a custom may be justified by the fact that the major part of our business consists of loans and investments. Similarly a first-born is entitled to a double share from a loan that had been secured by a pledge, since such a loan is not considered raui (a potential asset) but constitutes a real asset of the estate.
SOURCES: Am II, 66.

Q. May one heir sue his father's debtors independently of the other heirs?
A. Each heir may sue and collect his share of the inheritance.
SOURCES: Cr. 85; Pr. 212; Tesh. Maim. to Kinyan, 13; Am II, 8.

Q. A left four daughters and no sons. His widow claims that B owed money to her deceased husband, and seeks to recover it in payment of her ketubah.
A. In talmudic times a widow could collect her ketubah from real property only; therefore, it is stated in the Talmud that when a person dies, his debtors or depositaries shall repay their obligations to the person's heirs and not to his widow. But, the Geonim enacted a law that a woman may collect her ketubah from movable property and even from property her husband has given away to his heirs before his death. Nowadays, then, a woman may collect her ketubah from her husband's property in the hands of debtors and depositaries. Therefore, if the widow will swear that A did not leave her enough property to cover her ketubah, B must pay her the money he owed A. If B denies that he owes anything to A, he must take an oath to that effect and be free from obligation.
SOURCES: Cr. 85; Pr. 211; Am II, 8.

Q. A owed money to several persons. When B demanded his money from A, the latter admitted the debt but claimed that since he did not possess enough money or valuables to cover all his obligations, he preferred to divide his possessions equitably among his creditors. Since A admits, in court, his debt to B, may the latter force A to repay that debt in full, before he divides his property?
A. Since A owes money to several persons, and since he owes more than the total value of his possessions, each creditor is entitled to receive an equal share of such possessions irrespective of the amount due him. The debtor, however, may distribute his assets among his creditors in proportion to the amount due to each, before they come to court; such distribution would be irrevocable, and would even constitute a praiseworthy act. Since A is willing so to divide his possessions, no judge can force him to favor one creditor at the expense of the other creditors. However, before receiving his share of A's possessions, movables or immovables, each creditor will have to take a creditor's oath — the same oath that a creditor takes upon collecting his debt from encumbered property.
SOURCES: Cr. 219; Am II, 45; Tesh. Maim. to Mishpatim, 41.

Q. A's mother defrayed the expenses of A's funeral but did so only in the nature of a loan to his estate. His widow, however, refused to repay the money to A's mother and insisted in taking his entire estate in payment of her ketubah.
A. A's funeral expenses must be defrayed with money taken from his estate, before his widow can collect her ketubah from it. Thus a person may not give away all his possessions to his heirs in the expectation that his funeral expenses would be paid from public funds (Ket. 48a); the same principle should apply when one gives away all his possessions to his wife. The claims of a creditor, however, should have priority over the decedent's funeral expenses, since the appropriation of a creditor's own money to pay another person's funeral expenses would constitute downright thievery. On the other hand, just as an exemption of bedding, food for thirty days, and clothing to last twelve months, is allowed to a bankrupt debtor (B. M. 113b), so an exemption of the bare funeral expenses should be allowed in the case of a decedent's insolvent estate as against both the creditor and the widow.
This Responsum is addressed to Rabbi Israel, and the decision is in direct contradiction of that recorded in Cr. 184; ibid. 243; Pr. 176; ibid. 964; Mord. Ket. 157; Rashba I, 1103; and Tashbetz, 491.
SOURCES: Pr. 926; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 176c.

Q. R. Eliezer bound himself by a herem to give his daughter Gutlin, a minor, in marriage to Miriam's son, Isaac Levi, also a minor; and Miriam also obligated herself by a herem. Both parents put up a trust fund of three pounds for the couple, on condition that in case one of the parties dies before marriage the parents should divide between themselves the principal and the accrued interest. R. Eliezer died, and subsequently, but before her marriage, his daughter also died. A young son by a former marriage, who is also motherless, and a widow survived him. The trustee of the orphan, appointed by the community, and the widow, both made claims to one half of the trust-fund money. To whom should it be given?
It seems to me that the orphan is entitled to this money since it was not an actual asset at the time R. Eliezer died, and a widow collects her ketubah only from actual assets. The fact that the widow is in possession of the money, as the court gave it to her temporarily, does not make this asset any more actual as is evident from the case, quoted in the Talmud, of the woman with whom notes of indebtedness were deposited (Ket. 85a). Neither does the principle of Miggo apply to her since the money was given to her by the court and since the previous year she was obliged to make out a detailed statement of her assets, for the purpose of taxation and assessment for charity, in which statement the trust-money was listed. Signed: Moses Azriel.
A. Since half of the fund which belonged to R. Eliezer was to be given to the couple on their wedding day and was to be returned to R. Eliezer in case of death, it did not leave R. Eliezer's possession, and was, therefore, at the time of his death, an actual asset of his estate from which his widow is entitled to collect her ketubah. The widow is further entitled to collect her ketubah from the interest that accrued on the investment up to R. Eliezer's death, but not from the interest that accrued after his death.
SOURCES: Pr. 981; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 172b.

Q. A's widow, Leah, and his children put forth their claims, through representatives, regarding real property left to A by his mother on condition that after A's death the property be transferred to A's children and not be used to pay Leah's ketubah. Leah claimed that the said property never belonged to A's mother since the latter received it in payment of her ketubah, but failed to take the required oath before collecting such ketubah. Leah, therefore, demanded her ketubah from this property. A's sons, then, produced a document to the effect that A, foregoing the required oath, permitted his mother to take the property of his deceased father in payment of her ketubah, and bestowed upon her as a gift whatever amount the property was worth in excess of her ketubah. Leah, however, claimed that as soon as her father-in-law died, his property, automatically falling to her husband, was subject to the lien of her ketubah, and that A, therefore, had no right to waive the oath his mother was required to take and to bestow gifts upon her without her (Leah's) permission.
A. The property belongs to the grandchildren who were already born at the time the gift was made by A's mother, and Leah cannot collect her ketubah therefrom. We have no proof that A's mother received more than the amount specified in the ketubah. A's document bestowing on his mother as a gift whatever she received over and above her ketubah does not prove that she actually received more than was due her. Leah's claim that A had no right to bestow gifts without her permission is valid only in regard to real property, but a husband may sell or give away personal property without his wife's permission. Therefore, A's mother had a right to give her property to A and to his children. Moreover, since Leah is not certain that A's mother collected more than her ketubah, and can take no oath to that effect, the property goes to A's children.
This Responsum is addressed to "my teachers and relatives, Rabbi Menahem and Rabbi Hillel."
SOURCES: Cr. 205; Pr. 987–8; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 153c; Tesh. Maim. to Mishpatim, 7; cf. ibid. 43; Maharil, Responsa 75.