Ketubot 84

מאי לאו בשעמד בדין לא בשלא עמד בדין

Does this not refer to one who had already been tried? No, it refers to one who had not yet been tried.

והא מדרישא בשעמד בדין סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין דקתני רישא אין לי אלא דברים שמשלמין עליהם את הקרן תשלומי כפל תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה והאונס והמפתה ומוציא שם רע מנין ת"ל (ויקרא ה, כא) ומעלה מעל ריבה

But since the first clause deals with the case of one who had been tried, should not the second clause also deal with such a case? For in the first clause it was stated: I only knew [that liability is incurred in] cases where compensation is paid for the actual value only, how do I know that the same is true with regard to the double payment and the fourfold or fivefold and [in those of] the rapist, the seducer and the one who brings out a bad name? Scripture says, “And commit a trespass,” this includes such cases.

היכי דמי אי דלא עמד בדין כפילא מי איכא אלא פשיטא בשעמד בדין ומדרישא בשעמד בדין סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין

How is this statement to be understood? If [it refers to] a man whose had not yet been tried [the objection could be raised:] Is double compensation payable in such circumstances? Rather it is obvious that [it refers to one] who had already been tried. And since the first clause deals with one who had been tried, the final clause also must deal with one who had already been tried?

א"ל יכילנא לשנויי לך רישא בשעמד בדין וסיפא בשלא עמד בדין וכולה ר"ש היא ושינויי דחיקי לא משנינן לך דא"כ אמרת לי ליתני רישא ר"ש אומר או ליתני סיפא דברי ר"ש

He said to him: I could have solved this for you. that the first clause deals with one who had already been tried, and the final clause with one who had not yet been tried and that the entire baraita represents the view of R. Shimon, But I would not give you forced interpretations, for, were I to do so, you might say: Then either the first clause should begin with “R. Shimon said” or the final clause should conclude with “these are the words of R. Shimon.”

אלא כולה בשעמד בדין ורישא רבנן וסיפא ר"ש

Rather the entire [baraita] refers to one who had already been tried, the first clause being the view of the rabbis and the final clause that of R. Shimon,

ומודינא לך לענין קרבן שבועה דרחמנא פטריה מוכחש

and I agree with you in regard to the sacrifice for [taking a false] oath, that the Torah has exempted him from [the word] “And he denied.” When I said, that it is compensation,

וכי קאמינא ממון הוי להורישו לבניו

I meant that he transmits it as an inheritance to his sons.

איתיביה ר"ש אומר אם לא הספיקה לגבות עד שמת האב הרי הן של עצמה ואי אמרת ממון הוי להורישו לבניו לעצמה אמאי דאחין בעי מיהוי

He raised an objection against him: R. Shimon says: If her father died before she could collect [the payments] they belong to her. Now if you say [that this] is compensation in respect that it is bequeathed as an inheritance to one’s sons, why should the compensation belong to her? Should it not, in fact, belong to the brothers?

אמר רבא האי מילתא קשאי בה רבה ורב יוסף עשרין ותרתין שנין ולא איפרק עד דיתיב רב יוסף ברישא ופירקה שאני התם דאמר קרא (דברים כב, כט) ונתן האיש השוכב עמה לאבי הנערה חמשים כסף לא זיכתה תורה לאב אלא משעת נתינה

Rava said This matter was difficult for Rabbah and R. Joseph for twenty-two years and they could not solve it until R. Joseph sat at the head [of the academy] and solved it: There it is different [from other fines] because Scripture said, “Then the man that lay with her shall give to the young girl’s father fifty [shekels of] silver” [which implies that] the Torah has not given the father the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him.

וכי קאמר רבה ממונא הוי להורישו לבניו בשאר קנסות

And when Rabbah said, “It is compensation in respect that it is transmitted as an inheritance to his sons” he was referring to other fines.

אלא מעתה גבי עבד דכתיב (שמות כא, לב) כסף שלשים שקלים יתן לאדוניו הכי נמי לא זיכתה תורה לאדון אלא משעת נתינה יתן לחוד ונתן לחוד

But then, in the case of a slave where it is written, “He shall give (יתן) to his master thirty shekels of silver,” so too here the Torah has not given the master the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him? [The word] yiten and [the word] venatan are different.

אי הכי ת"ל וכחש ת"ל ונתן מיבעי ליה

If so, [instead of deducing the exemption from sacrifice] from, “And he denied” it should have been deduced from “And he shall give.”

אמר רבא כי איצטריך וכחש כגון שעמדה בדין ובגרה ומתה דהתם כי קא ירית אביה מינה דידה קא ירית

Rava said: The words “And he denied” were required in a case, for instance, where the girl’s case had been brought to court and then she became adolescent and then died, in which case when the father receives [the fine] he inherits [it] from her.

אי הכי יצאו אלו שהן קנס ממון הוא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק יצאו אלו שעיקרן קנס

If so, how could it have been said “These are excluded [from liability] since they are fines”... when they are in fact compensation? Nahman b. Yitzchak said These are excluded since they are basically fines.

איתיביה ר"ש פוטר שאינו משלם קנס על פי עצמו טעמא דלא עמד בדין הא עמד בדין דמשלם על פי עצמו קרבן שבועה נמי מיחייב

He raised another objection: R. Shimon exempts him for one does not pay a fine based on one’s own admission. The reason is because he has not been convicted but if he had been convicted, since he does pay even on his own admission, he would be liable to bring a sacrifice for a false oath.

רבי שמעון לדבריהם דרבנן קאמר להו לדידי אע"ג דעמד בדין רחמנא פטריה מוכחש אלא לדידכו אודו לי מיהת היכא דלא עמד בדין דכי קא תבע קנסא קא תבע

Shimon was responding to the words of the other rabbis: According to my own view [he argued] even though he has been tried he is exempt [from bringing the sacrifice as may be deduced] from the text “And deal falsely.” But according to your view, however, you must at least admit that [the man is exempt] if he has not yet been tried, since the claim against him is a fine