Responsa for Sanhedrin 47:6
גופא אמר ר"ל פה קדוש יאמר דבר זה תני עדו
one master [Rabin]accepts the reasoning of <i>Miggo</i>; while the other [R. Dimi] rejectsit.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The dispute is whether this reasoning is acceptable in general, though in the actual case under discussion there may possibly be no difference. Thus, Rabin holds that miggo is generally accepted, and here too, whilst R. Dimi rejects this reasoning here and elsewhere; therefore, it is only because R. Meir maintains that a litigant must substantiate his whole statement that his opponent is able to disqualify his witnesses, as explained above, and this is irrespective of whether the judges have been proved incompetent or not. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
Teshuvot Maharam
Q. Before A and B entered, as equal partners, into a business transaction wherein B was to be the active partner, A said to B: "Give me your faithful word as a religious Jew that you will not deny me my share of the profits." B complied with A's request. When they came to divide the profits, A demanded that B take an oath to the effect that there were no other profits except those he had admitted. B claimed that he had already given his word to A, which is equivalent to an oath.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A and C were negotiating a marriage. They deposited pledges with B. When a dispute arose between them, they brought their case before the worthies of the community who ordered B to deliver the pledges to C. This decision was later proven to be erroneous. Now A demands that B compensate him for the loss of his pledges.
A. Since B claims that A and C had undertaken to abide by the decision of the community leaders, and that he merely obeyed such decision, he is free from obligation. Although these leaders were ignorant in the law, their decision was nevertheless binding since A and C had accepted them as judges. The leaders and worthies of a community, because they are generally accepted by the members of their community and are in the same category as the Syrian courts (Git. 23a), form an authoritative court. Should A deny B's claim (that he obeyed the order of the community leaders), B would be free from obligation since a witness supports his claim. Moreover, no oath is exacted from a trustee who claims to have carried out his commission. Even if the mistake of the court became known before B delivered the pledges to C, and B nevertheless obeyed the order of the court, he is free from obligation, for A and C originally agreed to abide by the decision of the community leaders; and the custom is widely accepted throughout our kingdom that whatever obligations a person assumes in the presence of the community leaders become binding and unretractable. The leaders of a community wield the same authority over the members of their community regarding matters for which they were elected, as the great scholars of each generation wield over all of Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 230; Tesh. Maim. to Shoftim, 10; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 298d; ibid. p. 349c. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 39.
A. Since B claims that A and C had undertaken to abide by the decision of the community leaders, and that he merely obeyed such decision, he is free from obligation. Although these leaders were ignorant in the law, their decision was nevertheless binding since A and C had accepted them as judges. The leaders and worthies of a community, because they are generally accepted by the members of their community and are in the same category as the Syrian courts (Git. 23a), form an authoritative court. Should A deny B's claim (that he obeyed the order of the community leaders), B would be free from obligation since a witness supports his claim. Moreover, no oath is exacted from a trustee who claims to have carried out his commission. Even if the mistake of the court became known before B delivered the pledges to C, and B nevertheless obeyed the order of the court, he is free from obligation, for A and C originally agreed to abide by the decision of the community leaders; and the custom is widely accepted throughout our kingdom that whatever obligations a person assumes in the presence of the community leaders become binding and unretractable. The leaders of a community wield the same authority over the members of their community regarding matters for which they were elected, as the great scholars of each generation wield over all of Israel.
SOURCES: Cr. 230; Tesh. Maim. to Shoftim, 10; Mordecai Hagadol, p. 298d; ibid. p. 349c. Cf. Moses Minz, Responsa 39.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. Before A and B entered, as equal partners, into a business transaction wherein B was to be the active partner, A said to B: "Give me your faithful word as a religious Jew that you will not deny me my share of the profits." B complied with A's request. When they came to divide the profits, A demanded that B take an oath to the effect that there were no other profits except those he had admitted. B claimed that he had already given his word to A, which is equivalent to an oath.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. Before A and B entered, as equal partners, into a business transaction wherein B was to be the active partner, A said to B: "Give me your faithful word as a religious Jew that you will not deny me my share of the profits." B complied with A's request. When they came to divide the profits, A demanded that B take an oath to the effect that there were no other profits except those he had admitted. B claimed that he had already given his word to A, which is equivalent to an oath.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.
A. B must take the oath usually taken by all partners, which is administered by the hazzan holding the Scroll of the law. Although giving one's faithful word is also considered an oath, it is not as solemn as the oath administered while holding the scroll of the Law, and can not take its place.
SOURCES: Cr. 171; Pr. 606; L. 379; Mord. Shebu. 765; cf. Hag. Maim. Shebuoth 11, 3; Moses, Minz, Responsa 17.
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Teshuvot Maharam
Q. A promised B that he would not summon him to court at all if he did not do so before a certain date. The specified date passed and A did not summon B to court. May A summon B to court hereafter?
A. A verbal release does not require a kinyan, but a conditional promise of release is not binding unless accompanied by a kinyan.
SOURCES: Pr. 718; cf. Mord. Sanhedrin, 677.
A. A verbal release does not require a kinyan, but a conditional promise of release is not binding unless accompanied by a kinyan.
SOURCES: Pr. 718; cf. Mord. Sanhedrin, 677.
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